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Abstract—Scientific image tampering is a problem that affects
not only authors but also the general perception of the research
community. Although previous researchers have developed meth-
ods to identify tampering in natural images, these methods may
not thrive under the scientific setting as scientific images have
different statistics, format, quality, and intentions. Therefore, we
propose a scientific-image specific tampering detection method
based on noise inconsistencies, which is capable of learning
and generalizing to different fields of science. We train and
test our method on a new dataset of manipulated western blot
and microscopy imagery, which aims at emulating problematic
images in science. The test results show that our method can
detect various types of image manipulation in different scenarios
robustly, and it outperforms existing general-purpose image
tampering detection schemes. We discuss applications beyond
these two types of images and suggest next steps for making
detection of problematic images a systematic step in peer review
and science in general.
Index Terms—Scientific images, Digital image forensics, Noise
inconsistency, Scientific image manipulation dataset
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of digital images has become increasingly ubiquitous
in all types of publications. What comes with the growing
importance of digital images is the development of image
tampering techniques. In the past, modifying or concealing
the content of an image would require dedicated personnel
and tools. Today, however, image tampering is much easier
with state-of-the-art image processing software. This trend has
affected many aspects of our society, as we see prominent
forgery cases occur in journalism and academia [1]. Conse-
quently, many detection techniques have been developed for
these scenarios (see [2]). Only recently, however, attention has
been paid to image manipulation in scientific publications [3].
Although it is possible to use existing methods on scientific
images directly, we hypothesize that significant adaptations
must be made due to the fact that they usually possess
distinctive statistical patterns, formats and resolutions. In
this work, we aim at developing a scientific-specific image
manipulation detection technique, which we test on a novel
scientific image manipulation dataset of western blots and
microscopy imagery—there are no datasets openly available
about scientific image manipulation yet (but see [4]). Thus, as
most scientific images increasingly come in digital form, the
detection of possible manipulations should also get at the same
level of quality as other fields that use digital images only.
It is undeniable that an increasing amount of tampered
images are finding their ways into scientific publications. Bik,
Casadevall and Fang [5] examined 20,621 biomedical research
papers from 1995 to 2014, where they find that at least 1.9
percent are subject to deliberate image manipulation. The fact
that these suspicious papers went through the careful reviewing
process suggests how difficult it is to examine image tampering
in scientific research manually. Because the large quantity of
digital images present in submitted manuscript, it is be crucial
for publishers to be able to identify image manipulation in an
automated fashion.
The scientific research context sets a different tolerance
for image manipulation. Many operations, including resizing,
contrast adjusting, sharpening, and white balancing are gen-
erally acceptable as part of the figure preparation process.
However, some others types of tampering, especially the
ones that alter the image content semantically, are strictly
prohibited. These manipulations include copy-move (without
proper attribution), splicing, removal, and retouching1. Acuna,
Brookes and Kording [6] developed a method to detect figure
element reuse across a paper database. Intra-image copy-move
can be detected rather robustly with SIFT features and pattern
matching [7]. However, detection of image manipulation that
does not involve reuse is significantly more challenging. A
comprehensive scientific image manipulation detection pipeline
should include manipulation detection.
As scientific papers are reviewed by experts, we reckon
that articles containing manipulations that incur in contextual
inconsistencies (e.g., brain activation patterns from fMRI in
the middle of a microscopy image) will be easily picked out.
What humans cannot see properly is the noise pattern within
an image—and scientists seeking to falsify images exploit this
weakness. Therefore, we propose a novel image tampering
detection method for scientific images, which is based on
uncovering noise inconsistencies. Specifically, our proposed
method contains the following features:
1) It is based on supervised learning, which is capable of
learning from existing databases and new instances.
2) It works for images of different resolutions and from
different devices.
3) It is not restricted to any specific image format.
4) It is capable of generating good predictions with a small
training set.
5) It is flexible and can be fine-tuned for different fields of
science.
In section II, we briefly summarize previous work on digital
image forensics. In section III, we discuss the design of our
proposed method. In section III-B2, we introduce our scientific
image manipulation datasets and present the test results of
1https://ori.hhs.gov/education/products/RIandImages/guidelines/list.html
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
07
79
9v
2 
 [c
s.C
V]
  4
 M
ar 
20
20
2our method on them. In section V, we conclude by discussing
limitations and future extension of our method.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
There have been a large amount of previous research
on image tampering detection, but very few of them focus
on scientific images. The first class of tampering detection
methods aims at detecting a specific type of manipulation, the
most common being resizing and resampling [8], [9], [10],
[11], [12], median filtering [13], [14], [15], [16], contrast
enhancement [17], [18], [19], [20], blurring [21], and multiple
JPEG compression [22], [23], [24], [25]. Many of these
manipulations are valid in the scientific research context, and
it can be non-trivial to merge results from single detectors in
order to build a comprehensive one.
The second class of tampering detection methods aims at
general-purpose image tampering detection. Dirik and Memon
[26] try to catch the inconsistency of Color Filtering Array
(CFA) patterns within images taken by digital cameras—a
signal generated by digital cameras. However, scientific images
are not necessarily taken by digital cameras. Wang, Dong and
Tan [27] leverage the characteristics of the DCT coefficients
in JPEG images to achieve tampering localization, but the
method is confined to a specific format. Mahdian and Saic
[28] propose a method that predicts tampered regions based
on wavelet transform and noise level estimation. All these
methods are unable to learn from data, which limits their
abilities to generalize to different fields. Another group of
methods combines steganalysis tools [29], [30] with Gaussian
Mixture Models (GMM) to identify potentially manipulated
regions [31], [32]. These unsupervised-learning-based methods
are also unable to learn from existing database effectively and
therefore tend to underperform in practice.
Because of the occurrence of large image datasets, neural-
network-based tampering detection methods are likely to yield
good performance [33], especially those based on Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNN) [34], [35], [36]. They usually target
high resolution natural images. It is unclear, however, whether
they can be transitioned for the scientific scenario. For example,
it is challenging to train such a network for scientific images
exclusively as they usually require tens of thousands of images
as training data, which to the best of our knowledge is not yet
available.
III. OUR PROPOSED METHOD
Our method is based on a combination of several hetero-
geneous feature extractors that are later combined to produce
single predictions for patches (Figure 1). At first, an input
image will go through a variable amount of residual image
generators. The type and amount of these generators can be
chosen based on the application. Each type of residual image
will have its own feature extractor, which is based on our
proposed feature extraction scheme with (possibly) different
configurations. The features are then fed into a classifier after
post-processing.
The proposed method works on residual images, which are
essentially image after filtering or the difference between an
image and its interpolated version. It is a way to discard content
and emphasize noise pattern within an image, which is widely
used in image manipulation detection practice. However, in
many previous works, only one type of residuals is used [26],
[32], [36]. Because each residual may have different sensitivity
levels to different types of manipulation, using only one not
only limits the method’s ability to detect a wide variety of
manipulation, but also renders the method more vulnerable
against adversaries. Therefore, we decide to combine a number
of residuals in our method to increase the robustness.
Because our feature extraction method drastically reduces
the dimensionality of image data, which relieves the need of a
huge amount of training data, it is possible to use a light-weight
classifier as the back end, such as logistic regression or support
vector machine (SVM). As there are many ways to generate
residual images, and that the feature extraction method comes
with a number of parameters to decide, our image manipulation
detection method possesses high degree of flexibility. Unlike the
parameters in neural networks, for example, which are rather
obscure for human beings, the underlying meanings of the
parameters in our feature extraction method are straightforward.
Therefore, it is easier for one to manually adapt our method
for different fields.
A. Residual Image Generators
There are numerous ways of generating residual images, we
list the following ones because they are functional for a wide
range of applications. Note that the capability of our method is
significantly influenced by the choice of residuals. However, it
is possible to design new residual image generators for specific
scenarios.
1) Steganalytic Filters
Steganalysis (techniques used for detecting hidden mes-
sages in communications) has been used in image
tampering detection practice extensively. This type of
analysis aims to expose hidden information planted in
images by steganography techniques. Although it is
not directly linked to image tampering detection, it is
suggested that that the tasks of image forensics and
steganalysis are very much alike when the action of
data embedding in steganography is treated as image
manipulating [37]. Similar to the rich model strategy
proposed in [29], we can apply many different filters and
see which one can spot inconsistencies. In our work, we
use several filters that provide a relatively comprehensive
view of potential inconsistencies (Figure 2).
The filters selected are high-pass because we want to
throw away information about the image content and
emphasize noise patterns as much as possible. The
residual image in this case is the image after convolution.
An example of steganalytic filtering residual is shown in
Figure 3.
2) Error Level Analysis (ELA)
ELA is an analysis technique that targets JPEG com-
pression. The idea behind it is that the amount of error
introduced by JPEG compression is nonlinear: a 90-
quality JPEG image resaved at quality 90 is equivalent
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Fig. 1. Overall design of our proposed method. The input image goes through several residual generators and feature extractors in parallel. All extracted
features will be merged in a postprocessing step and then fed to a classifier.
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Fig. 2. High-pass filters selected in our experiment.
to a one-time save of quality 81; a 90-quality JPEG
image resaved at quality 75 is equivalent to a one-time
save of quality 67.5 [38]; and so on. If some part of a
JPEG-compressed image is altered with a different JPEG
quality factor, when it is compressed again, the loss of
information of that part will differ from other regions.
To uncover the inconsistency, ELA residual is computed
by intentionally resaving the image in JPEG format
with a particular quality (e.g. 90) and then computing
the difference of the two images. An example of ELA
residual is shown in Figure 4.
3) Median Filtering Residual
Median filtering can suppress the noise of an image.
When applying median filtering to a tampered image,
the tampered part may possess a different noise pattern
and therefore respond differently. The median filtering
residual is the difference between the original image and
median filtered image. An example is shown in Figure
5.
4) Wavelet Denoising Residual
Wavelet denoising is a type of denoising method that
represents an image in wavelet domain and cancels
the noise based on that representation. Similar to the
median filtering residual’s case, the tampered region may
react differently compared to the rest of the image and
therefore give away its own identity. It is also suggested
by Dirik and Memon [26] that using wavelet denoising
can uncover the sensor noise inconsistency of digital
cameras. The wavelet denoising residual is given by the
difference between the original image and the denoised
image. An example is shown in Figure 6.
It is worth noticing that the tampered images in the
demonstrations are selected so that the manipulation pattern
is visible in the specific residual. However, in practice, this
may not always be the case. Usually it is necessary to examine
multiple residual images before drawing a conclusion.
(a) Tampered
image
(b) Mask (c) Residual
Fig. 3. Demonstration of steganalytic residual.
(a) Tampered
image
(b) Mask (c) Residual
(color-mapped)
Fig. 4. Demonstration of ELA residual.
B. Feature Extraction
Our method is patch-based, which means it will generate a
prediction for each patch in the image. Using patches instead
of single pixels to represent an image not only shrinks the
scale of computation, but also enriches the amount of statistical
information within each smallest unit. At the limit, the patch
size can be chosen so that pixel-based and patch-based become
almost the same. After deciding on the patch size, the feature
extraction step will generate a corresponding feature vector for
(a) Tampered
image
(b) Mask (c) Residual
(color-mapped)
Fig. 5. Demonstration of median filtering residual.
(a) Tampered
image
(b) Mask (c) Residual
(color-mapped)
Fig. 6. Demonstration of wavelet denoising residual.
4each patch in the image. In this section, we discuss how these
features vectors are computed.
1) Patch Reinterpretation: Residuals reduce the complexity
of image data, but they still have the same dimensionality as the
original image. To further compress data for classification, we
propose a new feature extraction method for image tampering
detection. Intuitively, an image region is considered to be
tampered not because it is unique itself, but mainly due to the
fact that it is different from the rest of the image. Therefore, an
ideal feature design should contain sufficient amount of global
information. We add global information by reinterpreting an
image region using the rest of the image.
TABLE I
LIST OF SYMBOLS USED IN FEATURE EXTRACTION
Symbol Description
(h,w) size of the image
(m,n) dimension of each patch
(s, t) dimension of the patch grid
lij
the likelihood function of the grid cell
on ith row and jth column
First, an input image of size (h,w) will be divided into
patches of size (m,n). If the shapes are not divisible, the image
will be cropped to the nearest multipliers of each dimension.
Therefore, an image of size (h,w) will be divided into a patch
matrix of size (bh/mc, bw/nc).
Then, the patch matrix will be split into a rectangular patch
grid of size (s, t), where each cell contains a certain number
of patches. The number of patches in most cells is⌊bh/mc
s
⌋
×
⌊bw/nc
t
⌋
,
except for those cells on the edges, which may have fewer
patches.
For each cell in the grid, we fit an outlier detector that is
capable of telling the likelihood of a new sample being an
outlier. Given a patch p, it can be reinterpreted by a vector v,
which is given by
v = (l11(p), l12(p), l13(p), . . . , l1t(p),
l21(p), l22(p), l23(p), . . . , l2t(p),
l31(p), l32(p), l33(p), . . . , l3t(p),
· · ·
ls1(p), ls2(p), ls2(p), . . . , lst(p)).
An illustration of this reinterpretation method is shown in
Figure 7, where black blocks represent patches, red blocks
represent grid cells and the yellow region represents the
tampered region. In this case, (s, t) = (3, 4). Because the
tampered region has a different residual pattern, and its
contaminated patches concentrate in one of the cells, the outlier
detector of that cell will learn a distinct decision boundary
compared to other ones. As a result, an authentic patch pa
will have lower outlier likelihood in all components except
for l23(pa); a tampered patch pt will have higher outlier
likelihood in all components except for l23(pt). This difference
in structure allows us to distinguish between authentic and
tampered patches. In practice, we use the histogram of v
(denoted by vh), which not only encodes the structure in
summary-statistics space, but also becomes position invariant.
1 2 3 t = 4
1
2
s = 3
m
n
Fig. 7. Patch reinterpretation illustration. The parameters are described in
Table I.
2) Feature Design: Besides vh, we include some other
information in order to concentrate more global information
within the feature. The final feature of a patch contains the
following components:
1) vh: the histogramed patch reinterpretation. After gener-
ating all histogramed reinterpretations of an image, we
normalize them to [0, 1].
2) Proximity information: how much the patch differs from
its neighborhood. We choose the Euclidean distance
between the histogramed reinterpretation of the patch
and those of its surrounding neighbors’.
3) Global information: how much the patch differs from
the entire image. After computing the histogramed
reinterpretations for all patches within an image, we
apply k-means clustering on them, which generates a set
of weights and cluster centroids. The additional global
information of a patch is given by the Euclidean distance
between the reinterpretation and the cluster centroids, as
well as the corresponding weights of the centroids.
EXPERIMENTS
Due to the lack of science-specific image manipulation
detection databases, we synthesize our own database for the
experiments.
Datasets
Our novel scientific image manipulation datasets mainly
consist of the following three types of manipulations:
1) Removal: covering an image region with a single color
or with noise. We manually select a rectangular region
to be removed from the image. Then we select another
rectangular region to sample the color or noise to fill
the removal region, where we can compute the mean
µ and standard deviation σ of the pixels. We generate
four images for each pair of selection according to the
configuration given in Table II.
5TABLE II
IMAGE GENERATION CONFIGURATION OF REMOVALS. THERE MEAN OF THE
REMOVAL REGION IS EQUAL TO THAT OF THE SAMPLE REGION’S, BUT WE
VARY THE STANDARD DEVIATION FROM ZERO (PURE COLOR) TO TWO
STANDARD DEVIATIONS TO CREATE DIFFERENT VISUAL EFFECTS.
Removal Region
Mean
Removal Region
Standard Deviation
µ 0
µ 0.5σ
µ σ
µ 2σ
2) Splicing: copying content from another image. We ran-
domly choose a small region from the foreground image
and paste it at an arbitrary location on the background
image. To create noise inconsistency, the region will
either be recompressed with JPEG or processed with
sharpening filters.
3) Retouching: modifying the content of the image. We will
randomly choose a small region within an image and
apply Gaussian blurring to it.
These manipulations are selected because we believe that they
are more prevalent in problematic scientific papers.
We build two datasets that contain western blot images and
microscopy images, respectively. We choose images around
these two topics because of their frequency in the literature
huge, and they are more susceptible to manipulation. We also
create a natural image dataset to compensate for the lack of
microscopy images for training. It is only used in the training
phase. The details of datasets are shown in Table IV. The
meanings of tampering type abbreviations are shown in Table
III.
TABLE III
TAMPERING TYPE ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation Meaning
R removal images
J splicing images recompressed by JPEG
F splicing images processed with sharpening filters
B Gaussian blurred images
G genuine images
TABLE IV
THE SPECIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED SCIENTIFIC IMAGE FORENSICS
DATASETS.
Collection ImageSource Contents
2 Average
Resolution
western blot western blot imagesfrom the Internet R(436), G(51) 137, 244
microscopy microscopy imagesfrom the Internet
R(180), J(20),
F(19), B(20),
G(21)
591, 906
natural
image
natural images from
the “pristine” collec-
tion of IEEE dataset
[43]
J(40), F(40),
B(40), G(40) 775, 328
2format: type(number of images)
C. Test Configurations
The sizes of images in the western blot collection are
significantly smaller. Therefore, we need to train a special
model for them. For the microscopy model, we added natural
images into the training set to compensate for the lack
of data. The patches from residual images are transformed
into frequency domain by Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT)
because it yields slightly better performance. Within each
model, the parameters of each feature extractor are the same.
Detailed configurations of the two models that we trained are
shown in Table V.
We use a one-class SVM outlier detector [39], provided by
scikit-learn [40], which is based on LIBSVM[41]. The kernel
we use is radial basis function, whose kernel coefficient (γ) is
given by the scale, which is
1
number of features× variance of all inputs .
The tolerance of optimization is set to 0.01; and ν (the upper
bound on the fraction of training errors and the lower bound
on the fraction of support vectors) is set to 0.1.
Note that the choice of parameters can significantly influence
the speed of feature extraction. One of the most expensive
operations is fitting SVM, which has a computational com-
plexity of O(N3), where N is the number of patches in each
grid cell. Therefore, it is important to choose an appropriate
(m,n) and (s, t) pair. With our Python implementation and
the configuration given in Table V, the extraction speed for
western blots is approximately 212.36 sec/megapixel (12.13
sec/image), while the extraction speed for microscopy images
is approximately 86.15 sec/megapixel (49.32 sec/image). We
tried to use ThunderSVM[42], which is a GPU-accelerated
SVM implementation. Although it has a much higher speed,
its precision is not ideal compared to LIBSVM. Therefore, our
experiments are conducted with LIBSVM only.
The number of centroids of k-means clustering is set to
k = 6, and the clustering algorithm is run 150 times with
different initializations in order to get a best result. We select
this particular value of k because when we apply k-means
clustering to vh, the tampered region would usually blend with
other clusters unless there are more than 6 centroids. Therefore,
we consider it reasonable to represent the major content of an
image by its first 6 cluster centroids.
TABLE V
TEST CONFIGURATION PARAMETERS
Patch
Dimension
Patch Grid
Dimension
# Training
Images
# Testing
Images
Western Blot (6, 6) (5, 5) 352 135
Microscopy (10, 10) (7, 7) 251 106
Because the dimensionality of the extracted feature is not
very high, the outputs of each feature extractor are simply
concatenated into a single feature vector and then fed to
the classifier. The classifier we use is a simple Multilayer
Perceptron neural network. For the western blot model, we
use a four-layer network with 200 units per layer; for the
microscopy model, we use a similar network with 300 units
6per layer. Softmax regression is applied to the last layer to get
the classification results.
IV. RESULTS
The performance evaluation metric that we use are patch-
level accuracy, AUC scores, and F1 scores. We compare the
performance of our model with two baseline models, which
are widely compared against in related papers:
1) CFA [26]: a method that uses nearby pixels to evaluate
the Camera Filter Array patterns and then produces the
tampering probability based on the prediction error.
2) NOI [28]: a method that finds noise inconsistencies by
using high pass wavelet coefficients to model local noise.
For our method, the threshold for F1 score is 0.5. For the
baseline methods, their output map is normalized to [0, 1], and
the F1 score is acquired by setting the threshold to 0.5.
Table VIII shows the accuracies of the three methods on
genuine images, where AUC and F1 scores does not apply.
Table VI and VII shows the AUC scores and F1 scores of
our methods compared to the baseline. The meanings of the
abbreviations can be seen in Table III. The “overall” scores are
computed across the entire dataset, including genuine images.
A visual comparison of the results of each method is shown
in Figure 8.
It can be seen that CFA cannot handle western blot images
very well, as it has low accuracy on genuine images. Its
performance on J, F and B tampering types are also mediocre.
NOI has better behavior at locating noisy regions in the image,
but it fails drastically when encountering manipulations that
contain less noise. It constantly treats R[0] and B manipulations
as negatives, which yields a false negative region that is
not always separable. Its performance on J images is not
very satisfactory as well. Generally speaking, the performance
of our method is more consistent across different types of
manipulations, which makes it more reliable in practice.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We have proposed a novel image tampering detection method
for scientific images, which is based on uncovering noise
inconsistencies. We use residual images to exploit the noise
pattern of the image, and we develop a new feature extraction
technique to lower the dimensionality of the problem so that
it can be handled by a light-weight classifier. The method is
tested on a new scientific image dataset of western blots and
microscopy imagery. Compare to two base line methods popular
in the literature, results suggest that our method is capable of
detecting various types of image manipulations better and more
consistently. Thus, our solution promises to solve an important
part of image tampering in science effectively.
There are also some weaknesses in our study. First, our
proposed method is tested on a custom database, which
only contains a small amount of samples. We only include
several types of manipulations in our datasets, which is rather
monotonous compared to the space of all possible image
tampering techniques. Nonetheless, the choice of these specific
3format: R[noise standard deviation]
image sources and manipulation types is inspired by existing
problematic papers. If our method is capable of detecting these
manipulations to some extent, we believe that it can make
valuable discoveries once put into practice.
Second, we think that noise-inconsistency-based methods do
possess certain limitations. For example, not all manipulation
will necessarily trigger noise inconsistency; it is also easier
for one to hide the noise inconsistency, had he/she known the
underlying mechanism of the automatic detector. This kind of
adversarial attack, however, is significantly challenging and
unlikely to be done by the average scientist. In the future, we
want to develop more advanced methods that take both image
content and noise pattern into account.
However, our proposed method is one of the first methods
that tackles scientific image manipulation directly. Put together
in screening pipelines for scientific publications (similar to
[6]), our method would significantly expand the range of
manipulations that could be captured at scale. It also makes
predictions based on many types of residuals, which possesses
improved robustness. The method a set of easily adjustable
parameters, which allows it to be adapted for different fields
with less effort and a smaller amount of training data.
We would like to continue extending the database with
more images from various disciplines to make it standard
and comprehensive, and report test results on the updated
version. It is our hope that the datasets that we propose can
also be useful for the nascent Computational Research Integrity
research area. But we are also facing a major difficulty: there
are no openly available datasets on images that actually come
from science (although see the efforts in [4]). The images that
we currently have are collected from the Internet, and form
a small but significant portion of images with manipulation
issues. Unfortunately, access to problematic scientific images
are tend to be removed from the public soon after retraction.
So far, neither publishers nor authors are yet willing to
share those images for understandable reasons. Hopefully,
once scientific image tampering detection methods prove their
efficacy, publishers and funders can start to share and create
datasets with proper safeguards to check for potential problems
during peer review – similar to how they do it with full-text
through the Crossref organization4.
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